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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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____________
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____________
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   v.
LAMAR BROWN,
        Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00083)
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane
____________
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(Filed: June 19, 2008)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Lamar Brown appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to vacate a sentence
of life imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On March 6, 2002, municipal police officers executed a search warrant at Brown’s
residence.  The search yielded a quantity of crack cocaine along with marijuana and cash. 
The search warrant was accompanied by an affidavit of probable cause, which described a
controlled purchase of crack cocaine made by a confidential informant from Brown at the
latter’s residence five days earlier.  The affiant was Officer John Evans, but the controlled
purchase was actually organized by Lieutenant John Goshert.
On April 10, 2002, a grand jury indicted Brown on a charge of unlawful
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1).  Prior to trial, Brown’s attorney (Lori Ulrich of the Federal Public Defender’s
Office) filed a number of motions aimed at suppressing invalidly obtained evidence.  The
District Court denied the pretrial motions without conducting a hearing.
After a two-day trial, Brown was convicted, and he obtained new counsel (Gerald
Lord).  On June 19, 2003, the District Court sentenced Brown to a term of life
3imprisonment.  Shortly thereafter, Brown filed a notice of appeal, but then voluntarily
withdrew it, so we dismissed the appeal on December 17, 2003.  Apparently, Brown and
Lord made a strategic decision that a collateral attack would be more likely to succeed.
Several months later, on July 9, 2004, Brown filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which is a vehicle for prisoners in the federal system to
argue that their sentence is subject to collateral attack.  Brown therein alleged that Ulrich
was ineffective for failing to adequately support her pretrial suppression motions. 
According to Brown, the confidential informant on which the officers had relied in
obtaining the search warrant was lying, and Ulrich inadequately investigated this fact. 
The District Court held a hearing on February 3, 2005, in which various members of
Brown’s family (we include in this group Brown’s mother, daughter, and former
girlfriend), Brown himself, Ulrich, Lt. Goshert, and another officer testified.  The parties
were then directed to file additional supplements over the course of another year.  On
October 27, 2006, the District Court entered a memorandum and order denying Brown’s
§ 2255 motion.  Brown’s timely appeal followed.
II.
We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253(a).  “We review the District Court’s decision de novo because both the performance
and prejudice prongs of ineffective assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions
of law and fact.”  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2002).
4Brown argues that Ulrich provided ineffective assistance because she failed to
plead facts in the motion to suppress and the motion to compel disclosure of the identity
of the confidential informant, facts that purportedly would have resulted in the District
Court’s granting a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which
permits a defendant to challenge in a hearing the validity of an affidavit supporting a
search warrant “where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause.”  Id. at 155-56.
In the context of a § 2255 collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, the movant must show (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); and
(2) prejudice.  Id. at 692.  Both prongs must be met for the movant to succeed, Carpenter
v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 2002), and yet Brown satisfies neither.
With respect to the performance prong, “our analysis must begin with the strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.  The defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.”  George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Here, it is undisputed that Ulrich did file a
motion to suppress and a motion for a Franks hearing based on the alleged lies of the
We do not suggest that Ulrich would have performed below an objective standard1
of reasonableness even had the officers talked to Brown’s family members, for, given
family members’ likely bias, a competent attorney might still have left them out as
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affiant, Officer Evans, contained in the affidavit supporting the search warrant.  Brown
argues that Ulrich should have done more because, according to him, no controlled buy
ever took place at his house on March 1, 2002, he told Ulrich this fact, and Ulrich
nevertheless did not interview Brown’s family members who would have corroborated
Brown’s story.
We agree with the District Court that Ulrich’s not “doing more” does not
constitute performance that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under
Strickland.  The test under Franks is whether the officers “knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth,” made one or more material false statements in the
warrant affidavit.  See United States v. Rufus Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between informants’ untruthfulness and the affiant’s intentional or
reckless falsity, the latter of which is required to obtain a Franks hearing).  It was
objectively reasonable for Ulrich to believe that additional testimony from Brown’s
family members would not have contributed to her ability to “make a substantial
preliminary showing” about the officers’ state of mind when making their affidavit,
especially where there is no indication that Brown’s family members ever told Officer
Evans or Lt. Goshert a story directly contrary to what the confidential informant provided,
and yet the officers blindly went ahead with the version included in the warrant affidavit.1
witnesses within her sound strategic discretion.  We merely explain that even the one fact
that would have connected the family members to the affiant’s state of mind is missing
here, so a fortiori, Brown fails to establish Strickland’s performance prong.
We also agree with the District Court that further discovery and investigation2
would not aid Brown’s § 2255 motion.  Consistent with the theme of this opinion, we are
convinced that an ultimate discovery that no controlled purchase took place on March 1,
2002 (assuming arguendo that were the truth) sheds no light on Ulrich’s effectiveness as
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With respect to the prejudice prong, the movant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir.
2001).  “Reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”  Id.
Here, even had Ulrich done everything Brown now alleges that she should have
done, the District Court would not have granted a Franks hearing because none of
Brown’s family members testified definitively (at the § 2255 hearing) that Brown did not
actually engage in the precise drug transaction in question in his residence on the
afternoon of March 1, 2002.  Further, even had Brown’s family members offered
compelling testimony, Brown still could not show that the officers lied intentionally or
made representations with reckless disregard for the truth.  At best Brown’s family
members’ testimony raises a credibility battle between themselves and the confidential
informant, but such a battle has de minimis effect on what Franks requires Brown to
establish with respect to the search warrant affiant, at least where there is no indication
whatsoever that the officers conspired with the informant to lie.2
counsel under Strickland, on the affiant’s state of mind under Franks, or on Brown’s
actual innocence with respect to the items found in his residence on March 6, 2002.  Like
the District Court, we are cognizant that we are dealing with a sentence of life
imprisonment, but we are bound by § 2255 and its interpretive rules, which do not permit
us to undo that sentence here.
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III.
Because Brown cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which is
the only basis for his appeal, the District Court did not err in concluding that his sentence
is valid, and so we will affirm its order denying his motion under § 2255.
